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Abstract—  Today  internet  users  use  a  single  identity  to  access 
multiple services. With single sign-on (SSO), users don’t have to 
remember  separate  username/password  for  each  service 
provider,  which  helps  the  user  to  browse  through  the  web 
seamlessly. SSO is however susceptible to phishing attacks. This 
paper describes a new anti phishing SSO model based on mobile 
QR code. Apart from preventing phishing attacks this new model 
is also safe against man in the middle & reply attacks. 
Keywords-authentication;  single  sign-on;  phishing;  onetime 
password; QR code 
I.   INTRODUCTION  
Internet is becoming more and more user centric each day.  
With the advent of web 2.0 internet users are becoming more 
inclined  to  use  services  from  multiple  content  and  service 
providers  (CSP  or  SP).  Most  SPs  provide  user  registration 
service  whereby  a  user  can  create  his/her  own  account  and 
maintain  it.  As  such  a  user  has  to  maintain  separate  user 
accounts (username and password) for each of the SPs he/she 
uses. A study shows that today a typical user needs to maintain 
about twenty five different accounts which require password 
and  uses  eight of  them  in  a given day[1].  Not  only  is this 
approach  annoying  to  the  user,  it  also  raises  some  serious 
security questions, e.g. password fatigue [1]. 
Single sign-on(SSO) is one approach which aims to address 
the root cause of this problem[2]. With single sign-on, a user 
can create one account and use that account to login once and 
use  multiple  services  hosted in  different domains. There are 
three components or actors of a single sign-on system. A IdP or 
“identity  Provider”,  a  “Service  Provider”  (SP)  or  “Relying 
Party” (RP) and the user.  RP relies on IdP(s) to authenticate 
user credentials. SSO approach outsources the responsibility of 
user authentication from service providers to IdPs. Not only 
does SSO reduces the burden of the user, a SSO system can 
also enable users to share contents between different service 
providers[3]. Many commercial solutions exist which provide 
SSO  service,  such  as  OpenID[4],  Information  Card[5]  and 
SAML [6] based SSO Shibboleth. 
In the next section we will go through these models and see 
their limitations. 
II.  SINGLE SIGN-ON PROCESS 
A.  Existing Systems 
Shibboleth : Shibboleth is an open source single sign-on 
solution  which  is  best  suited  for  portal  or  Intranet 
applications[7].  It uses Security Assertion Markup Language 
(SAML),  an  OASIS  specification  for  xml  based  security 
assertions.  There  are  two  main  components  of  shibboleth 
system  namely  “Identity  Provider”  (IdP)  and  “Service 
Provider” (Sp). 
In  this  system  if  a  user  wants  to  access  a  service  or  a 
resource of a SP, the SP redirects the user's web browser to a 
WAYF server. WAYF server displays a set of organizations to 
the  user  from  which  the  user  chooses  one.  Once  the  user 
chooses  an  organization,  user’s  browser  is  redirected  to 
corresponding login page of IdP and user provides his login 
credentials.  Once the user successfully logs in, user’s browser 
is redirected back to SP who decides whether to enable access 
for this user or not. 
OpenID: OpenID[4] provides a user centric authentication 
model  in  a  sense  user  can  chose  to  implement  his/her  own 
OpenID  provider  or  selects  from  a  list  of  existing  OpenID 
providers. Main components of an OpenID system are User-
Agent, Relying Party (RP) and OpenID Provider (IdP). 
User  initiates  the  authentication  process  with  RP  using 
“User Agent”. RP then, depending of user provided identifier, 
discovers user’s IdP and redirects “User Agent” to IdP with an 
authentication request. User performs authentication at IdP side 
with username/password and IdP then redirects “User Agent” 
to  RP  again  with  a  security  assertion  message  specifying 
whether authentication has succeeded or failed. Based on this 
assertion RP decides whether to grant the user permission to 
access its services or not. 
Major advantage of OpenID is it doesn’t require any pre-
established contract between RPs and IdPs. But it is susceptible 
to phishing attack[8]. 
Information Card:  Information Card is based on real world 
multi identity concept[9]. Like Driving license, passport etc an 
Information Card user can have different identity sectors. Each sector contains a different assertion which can be provided by 
different  identity  providers.  When  a  user  accesses  services 
from a RP he/she logins in with one of the identity sectors or 
cards instead of username/password, with rest of the identity 
sectors remains hidden from RP. 
Microsoft  Cardspace  is  a  SSO  solution  from  Microsoft 
based  on  information  card  approach[10].  Information  card 
approach  provides  more  flexibility  than  username/password 
approach. As the information cards or sectors can be encrypted, 
it is also more secure than simple username/password. But with 
respect  to  OpenID,  it  is  a  very  heavy  system.  Different 
Information Card identity sectors are stored in user computer 
which  makes  it  susceptible  to  various  security/privacy 
issues[8]. 
B.  Phishing Vulnerability in SSO 
Whoever  there  are  certain  security  limitations  of  SSO 
systems.  SSO  involves  crossing  security  domains  between 
different SPs. Moreover most IdPs rely on username/password 
as  their  preferred  authentication  method.  And  as  such  it  is 
susceptible to phishing attacks[11] [12] [13]. 
From the above discussion, login procedure of most of the 
Single Sign-On systems can be generalized to a set of common 
steps[14]. At the first phase user establishes unique identity by 
registering  to  an  IdP.  At  the  second  phase  user  accesses 
services provided by different RPs by the following steps: 
1.  User requests a Service Provider or Relaying Party 
(say  RP1)  to  access  services  provided  by  the  RP1.  RP1 
initiates the SSO process.  
2.   RP1 redirects the request to Identity Provider (IdP1) 
in order to authenticate the user.  
3.    User  authentication  is  done  by  username/password 
method or certificates. 
4.   IdP1 asserts user credentials to RP1 by sending an 
application ticket (AuthToken1) or assertion. 
5.   Based  on  the  assertions  RP  decides  whether  to 
provide service to the user or not. 
6.   If  the  user  wants  to  access  services  from  another 
service  provider  RP2,  RP1  will  forward  AuthToken1  to 
RP2. RP2 then can verify user credentials with IdP1 just by 
sending AuthToken1 to IdP1. User doesn’t need to provide 
his/her credentials again.  
Fugure 1. provides the pictorial representation of the steps. 
User
Identity Provider
Service Provider
4. IdP Sends 
Security 
assertion to 
Service provider
2. User is 
redirected to IdP
1. User requests 
for service
3. User provides 
identity to IdP
5.User Accesses 
the service  
Figure 1. SSO general model 
 
It is at stage 2 & 3 that the system is susceptible to 
phishing. Malicious RP can display a phishing page and as the 
user  enters  his/her  username  and  password,  RP  can  obtain 
details about user credentials. Since there is no way for the user 
to  authenticate  RP,  he/she  becomes  vulnerable  to  phishing 
attack[15]. 
As  can  be  seen  most  of  the  SSO  systems  are 
susceptible to “verifier impersonation” or phishing attacks as 
they use password for credential verification[16]. Phishing is a 
major  issue  in  today’s  internet  oriented  life  which  causes 
massive financial loss every year[17]. It is therefore important 
to prevent phishing in SSO. 
In the next section we will see previous works that 
have been done to prevent phishing in SSO systems. 
III.  PREVIOUS WORKS NO ANTI PHISHING MECHANISM FOR 
SSO 
Various  client  side  solutions  exist  which  can  detect  a 
phishing page. E.g. Personal icon from myOpenID which can 
be used on a particular user’s PC only. Solutions are provided 
by  Verising  (Validation  Certificate  for  IE7  and  seatbelt  for 
Firefox) but they are browser dependent and not cost effective. 
An  improved  SSO  solution  has  been  proposed  by  [18] 
based on Kerberos[19]. This model uses two passwords instead 
of one, one by authentication server and one by ticket granting 
server. Although this model adds one extra level of security, it 
is  of  little  help  to  prevent  phishing  in  a  distributed  web 
applications. Phishing  web pages can  be created  to  simulate 
this two phase approach and obtain both the passwords. 
Another approach is to use mobile SIM in authentication 
phase of a SSO[20]. As proposed in this model, during login 
phase  SIM  is  authenticated  and  proof  of  authentication  is 
presented to the identity provider (IdP). IdP then lets the user 
login successfully. One drawback of this approach is that the 
authentication is carried out at the client side. Lee & Jeun proposed a new approach to address the issue 
of phishing in SSO[15]. Every time user wants to access the 
service from a RP, a new token will be generated and will be 
sent to the user’s email address. User then can login with the 
token. Although it solves the phishing problem, this solution 
breaks the basic philosophy of SSO. User needs to sign on to 
his/her  email  first  to  access  the  generated  token.  It  can  be 
thought of a SISO (single identity sign on) as it requires users 
to sign in twice. 
You & Jun proposed a solution to phishing problem in SSO 
by  using  I-PIN[21].  But  this  solution  can’t  be  implemented 
globally. 
We believe one possible solution to phishing problem in 
SSO is to use a onetime password approach. In the next section 
we will propose our solution for SSO with onetime password 
scheme. 
IV.  NEW SSO MODEL WITH ONETIME PASSWORD 
Apart from addressing the issue of phishing in SSO, the 
new  model  should also be  simple  enough,  so  that it  can be 
adopted  in  a real life  scenario. In other  words  the proposed 
model should not introduce any new steps or complexity into 
the  SSO  process  for  the  users.  We  will  select  our  onetime 
password generation schema with these goals in mind. 
PKI based onetime password generation model described 
by [22] provides good security features. But this model requires 
several  additional  steps  during  user  registration  and 
authentication phases. 
For  our  proposed  model  we  will  make  use  of  QR-code 
based onetime password schema[23]. Our idea is based on the 
assumption that most of the internet users today are equipped 
with a mobile phone that has a camera. 
The proposed model has three entities: an Identity Provider 
(IdP), a Service Provider (SP) and a User (UA). The model is 
divided in two phases: User Registration and User Verification. 
TABLE I.   NOTATIONS  
Notation  Meaning 
IDA  Username or identity of the   User 
RPA  Root password of the user 
XA  Secret key of the user 
EQR  Encoded QR code 
DQR  Decoded QR code 
a. Notations used in this model. 
 
A.  User Registration Phase  
1.   During this phase UA provides his/her IDA and RPA to 
IdP. 
2.   Based on RPA, IdP calculates a key XA using a one 
way hash function. 
3.   IdP  sends  XA  to  user’s  mobile  device  and  it  gets 
stored as a secret key. 
Fugure 2. below provides the pictorial representation of the 
steps. 
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Figure 2. User Registration Phase 
 
B.  User Verification Phase 
1.   User wants to access a service provided by SP. 
2.   SP redirects user to its IdP. 
3.   User provides his/her identity to IdP. 
4.   IdP then based on user’s identity calculates XA. IdP 
uses XA and a random number to calculate the QR code 
EQR.  
5.   IdP then sends EQR and a timestamp T1 to the user. 
6.   User  uses  the  embedded  camera  in  his/her  mobile 
device and stored XA to decode the QR code to DQR. DQR 
and timestamp T2 are then sent to the IdP. 
7.   IdP checks the validity of DQR and acceptability of T2 
and based on that sends a security assertion to SP. 
8.   SP then, based on the security assertion can allow or 
deny use of its services. 
9.  If the user now wants to access services from another 
service provider (SP1), SP can forward the assertion token 
to SP1 maintaining the basic principles of SSO.  
 
Fugure 3. below provides the pictorial representation of the 
steps. 
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Figure 3. User Verification Phase Generation of the secret key XA should be dynamic. i.e if 
the user’s XA is compromised due to loss of mobile device or 
any other reason, he/she will be able to generate a new secret 
key. Since XA is generated from RPA, All the user needs to do 
is to reset his/her RPA. 
V.  PROPOSED SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
As can be seen from the earlier discussion, the proposed 
single sign on model requires changes both in Identity Provider 
(or identity server) as well as in the client side to make use of 
the  QR-Code. We  will  now  discuss a  formal  model,  named 
QR-SSO  which  will  help  realizing  the  new  Single  Sign-on 
model.  In  specific  we  will  formally  define  the  goals  of  the 
system in terms of features that we believe the proposed system 
must support at minimum.  
A.  Identity Server Features 
This  section  defines  the  minimum  set  of  features  the 
proposed system must support in the identity server side. 
1.  The  system  must  adhere  to  the  basic  principles  of 
Single  Sign-on.    I.e.  once  the  user  logs  in  and  the 
server generates an authentication token, subsequent 
request for user authentication must return the same 
authentication token. 
2.  Login  process  must  support  both  user-id/password 
(root password) based login as well as QR-Code based 
login. 
3.  The system must not introduce any complicated steps 
in the user sign on process. 
4.  When logged in with root password, user must be able 
to regenerate his/her secret key. 
B.  QR-Code Enabled Client Features 
This  section  defines  the  minimum  set  of  features  the 
proposed system must support in the client side. 
1.  Storage and resetting of secret key in the client side 
should not introduce complicated steps.  
2.  The  process  of  sending  decoded  QR  value  to  the 
identity  server  to  the  identity  server  should  be 
automated if possible. 
C.  Identity Server Architecture 
In conjunction with the features described, we now present 
the logical layer cake of the identity server. A block diagram of 
the architecture is depicted in figure 4.  
1)  Data Access Layer 
The lowest layer in the identity server is the data access 
layer which includes an authentication database and a set of 
APIs to perform CRUD (create, read, update, delete) operations 
on the database.  On top of the data access Layer two different 
login handlers are defined to handle both QR-Code based login 
and user-id/password (root password) based login.  
   
2)  QR-Code Login Handler  
This  component  handles  login  process  when  login  is 
initiated via QR-Code. The sub-components are- 
a)  User-Id to Secret key Mapper 
This  subcomponent  maps  the  user-id  with  a  secret  key 
which are stored in the authentication database. 
b)  QR-Code Generator 
As  the  name  suggests,  this  sub-component  contains  the 
logic to generate QR-Code.   
c)  QR-Code Encoder 
This sub-component encodes the QR-Code with the secret 
key of the user and also adds additional information to the QR-
Code such as timestamp.  
d)  QR-Code Validator 
This sub-component validates the decoded value sent by the 
user by comparing the decoded QR-Code and timestamp with 
the original values.  
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Figure 4. Logical Layer Cake of Identity Server 
 
3)  Password Login handler 
This  component  handles  the  login  process  when  it  is 
initiated with root password. This component contains two sub-
components, which are- a)  Password Validator 
This  sub-component  validates  the  username/password  of 
the user (common to all username/password based systems). 
b)  Secret Key Generator 
This  sub-component  generates  a  new  secret  key  for  the 
logged-in user. Since it is under the control of “Password Login 
handler”, secret key can only be regenerated when logged-in 
with root password. 
4)  Auth Token Manager 
On  top  of  the  login  handlers,  we  have  an  authentication 
token manager. This component is responsible for managing 
authentication  tokens  for  logged-in  users  and  can  forward 
tokens to service providers if requested. This ensures that the 
Single Sign-on principles are not broken and a logged-in user is 
never requested to login again.  
5)  UI layer 
At the top of the architecture we have a UI layer which 
contains three components. 
a)  UI Manager 
This  sub-component  manages  the  UI  flow  of  the  login 
process and invokes either password based login UI or QR-
Code based login UI based on the request type. 
b)  Password UI 
This subcomponent handles the internal logic of password 
based login UI.  
c)  QR-Code UI 
This subcomponent handles the internal logic of QR-Code 
based login UI.  
D.  QR-Code Enabled Client 
As mention earlier, in this new SSO model a user can login 
to  the  identity  provider  with  the  QR-Code  simply  by  using 
his/her mobile device. But in order to decode the encoded QR-
Code properly the mobile device also needs to store and use the 
secret key of the user in the decoding process. Fortunately this 
can easily be done with a simple extension or plugin to the 
mobile device as supported by most mobile operating systems 
(e.g. Android, iOS). 
In  essence  we  can design  a simple  mobile plugin  which 
would  make  the  mobile  device  of  the  user  capable  of 
interacting with the identity server and decoding QR-Code. The 
secret key itself can be stored within mobile plugin’s internal 
memory. The plugin must provide interface to the user to set 
the secret key when needed. It ensures that the plugin satisfies 
the first feature mentioned before.  While the implementation 
details of the plugin may vary based on the mobile platform, 
the  internal  workings  of  the  plugin  can  be  described  in  the 
logical steps defined in table 1.  
 
 
 
 
1.  Get the Secret Key from Internal Store 
2.  Decode the QR Code 
3.  If the mobile is web enabled { 
a.  Send the decoded value using https 
4.  } 
5.  Else { 
a.  Display the decoded value to be entered 
manually. 
6.  } 
7.  Users logs in! 
Table 1. Mobile plugin logic 
   
As  mentioned  in  table  1,  the  decoded  value  can  be  sent 
directly to the identity server provided that the mobile device is 
web enabled.  This ensures that second feature required by the 
client is satisfied. 
E.  User Interaction 
From the user perspective this new model is quiet simple 
to use. When the user is redirected to Identity Provider’s login 
page, he/she needs to provide the identity (username) only. 
 
 
Figure 5. User Login step 1 
 
Upon receiving the identity of the user, IdP generates the 
QR-Code using the mechanism described before.   
Figure 6. User Login step 2 
 
The user then uses his/her mobile device to take a picture of 
the QR-Code. An app in user mobile device uses the secret key 
XA already stored in it (during registration phase) to decode the 
QR-Code.  If the user’s mobile device is web enabled, the app 
can directly send the decoded value and timestamp to the IdP 
using  HTTPS.  Alternatively  this  decoded  value  will  be 
displayed to the user who can then enter the value manually to 
login.  In either case, this schema doesn’t introduce any new 
complications for users.  
VI.  SECURITY ANALYSIS  
A.  Phishing attack 
Since the root password RPA is never disclosed during the 
verification  phase,  this  model  is  fairly  resistive  to  phishing 
attacks.  Further  if  the  secret key  XA  is  compromised  at any 
stage, UA can change it by simply resetting RPA at the IdP side. 
Since  XA  is  generated  using  one  way  hash  function,  it  is 
unfeasible to derive RPA from XA. 
B.  Other attacks 
Assuming timestamp difference (T1-T2) acceptable by the 
IdP is minimum, If a man in the middle intercepts DQR and tries 
to emulate the user, timestamp of DQR would be expired. In 
addition, as EQR is generated using a random number, after the 
allowed time interval IdP will select a new random number. 
Hence this model is fairly safe from both man in the middle 
attacks and reply attacks[23]. 
VII.  CONCLUSION  
 
In  this  paper  we  went  through  a  brief  overview  of  SSO 
process and analyzed its vulnerability against phishing attacks. 
We then presented a new SSO model with mobile QR code 
based  onetime  password  schema.  Security  analysis  of  our 
model shows that apart from preventing phishing attacks, our 
model is safe against man in the middle & reply attacks as well. 
Based  on  this  analysis  we  have  proposed  a  formal  system 
named QR-SSO which can be used to implement our model. 
This proposed system is simple from usability perspective and 
since most users today are equipped with camera embedded 
mobile device, this model can be adopted universally. 
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